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Abstract
Harrington (1988) shows that state-dependent enforcement based on past compliance records
provides an explanation to the seemingly contradictory observation that rmscompliance with
environmental regulations is high despite the fact that inspections occur infrequently and nes
are rare and small. This result has been labeled in the literature as the Harrington paradox.In
this paper we propose an improved transition structure for the audit framework where targeting
is based not only on rms past compliance record but also on adoption of environmentally
superior technologies. We show that this transition structure would not only foster the adoption
of new technology but also increase deterrence by changing the composition of rms in the
industry toward an increased fraction of cleaner rms that pollute and violate less.
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1 Introduction
Technological change is the main force improving the trade-o¤ between economic growth and en-
vironmental quality in the long run. Therefore, the e¤ect of environmental policies on the de-
velopment and spread of new technologies is among the most important determinants of success
or failure of environmental protection e¤orts (Aldy and Stavins 2007). Yet, environmental policy
instruments impose costs on polluters. When there is room for rms to untruthfully report emis-
sions without being caught and ned, i.e., there is imperfect enforcement, environmental policies
will have lower success in creating incentives for technological development and controlling the
generation of pollution than when the monitoring probability and stringency of the nes are such
that truthful reporting is induced. Unfortunately, in many circumstances, the frequent monitoring
and relatively high nes necessary to deter rms from under-reporting emissions are not available
due to lack of accurate monitoring technology, reluctance to use high penalties, and/or budget
constraints.
Harrington (1988) shows that a regulators enforcement can be made more e¢ cient by dividing
rms into two groups according to their past compliance record. Without increasing inspection
rates or nes, the regulator can lower the incidence of non-compliance by concentrating surveillance
resources on rms in one of the groups (the target group), punishing violations by exile into the
target group and (once there) rewarding rms found in compliance by returning them to the non-
target group. This scheme generates what Harrington refers to as enforcement leverage. Since
non-compliance triggers greater future scrutiny, the expected costs of non-compliance are beyond
the avoidance of immediate nes. Thus, he shows that there exists an equilibrium where rms have
an incentive to comply with regulations despite the fact that the cost of compliance in each period
is greater than the expected penalty.
Harrington (1988) o¤ers an explanation for the seemingly contradictory observation that compli-
ance rates across most industries are quite high despite the fact that inspections occur infrequently
and nes are rare and small, a result labeled in the literature as the Harrington paradox.In the
present paper we propose an improved transition structure for the audit framework where target-
ing is based not only on rmspast compliance record but also on adoption of environmentally
superior technologies. We show that this transition structure would not only foster the adoption
of the new technology but it would also increase deterrence by changing the composition of rms
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in the industry toward an increased fraction of cleaner rms that pollute and violate less.
Harringtons work initiated a substantial amount of theoretical work analyzing the robustness of
the results to alternative specications of information and compliance cost structures (see Harford
1991, Harford and Harrington 1991, and Raymond 1999), providing alternative explanations to
the paradox(see, e.g., Heyes and Rickman 1999, Livernois and McKenna 1999, and Nyborg and
Telle 2004 and 2006)1, and testing the empirical validity of his predictions (see, e.g., Helland 1998,
Clark et al. 2004, Cason and Langadharan 2006, and Gray and Shimshack 2011 for a review of the
literature).
Like our study, some previous studies have suggested alternative targeting methods.2 For
instance, in Friesen (2003), rms move randomly into the target group but escape based on observed
compliance behavior (Friesen 2003). Notably, Liu and Neilson (2009) and Gilpatric et al. (2011)
propose tournament-based dynamic targeting mechanisms. In their setting, a xed number of
rms are selected for inspection and those with the highest emissions are targeted with higher
inspection probability, which induces dynamic rank-order tournaments among inspected rms,
where enforcement leverage is enhanced by a competition e¤ect. Similarly, in our setting, rms with
the highest emissions (i.e., the rms that have not invested in more e¢ cient abatement technologies)
are also targeted with higher monitoring probability. In our model, however, rms have the option
to adopt the new technology "in exchange" for a reduced monitoring probability. Since technology
adoption serves the purpose of reducing emissions and increasing deterrence, the regulator can
achieve the same or an increased level of compliance at a lower total enforcement cost.
The fact that the stringency of enforcement can be reduced if polluting agents show evidence of
compliance-promoting activities is well documented in the literature. For example, Arguedas (2013)
1Heyes and Rickman (1999) show that if the environmental protection agency interacts with rms in more than
one enforcement domain, it might be optimal to tolerate non-compliance in some sub-set of domains in exchange
for compliance in others. Livernois and McKenna (1999) show that if rms self-report their emissions, lowering nes
for non-compliance raises the proportion of rms that truthfully report their compliance status. Nyborg and Telle
(2004) argue that if prosecution is costly, it might be optimal for the regulator just to issue a warning of some kind
instead of prosecuting violators, and not to impose further penalties if violators move into compliance upon receipt
of the warning.
2Like our paper, these studies also sorted rms into discrete groups and made use of the indenite Markov state-
switching model employed by Harrington. In constrast, some papers introduced a continuous reputation indicator
(that summarizes the frequency and size of past violations) and used dynamic simulation techniques to analyze more
e¢ cient targeting of inspections (see, e.g., Hentschel and Randall 2000).
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points out that in the Spanish legislation on hazardous waste, rms that invest in clean production
processes associated with responsible water consumption are rarely inspected and, if inspected, they
are rarely punished if found non-compliant. She also points out that penalty reductions in exchange
for investment e¤orts by polluting rms can be found in the EPAs Audit Policy, where nes for
non-compliance can be signicantly reduced if rms install enhanced emission control devices that
simplify regulatorsmonitoring processes.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the targeting scheme and the rms
compliance decisions. Section 3 presents the model of adoption and analyzes the impact of targeted
state-dependent enforcement on the rate of technology adoption vis-a-vis Harringtons two-group
targeting scheme. Section 4 studies the e¤ects of the enforcement scheme on adopters, non-
adopters, and aggregate emissions. Section 5 studies the e¤ects of the enforcement scheme on the
resources devoted to monitoring and enforcement. Section 6 presents some numerical simulations.
The nal section provides a discussion and concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider a competitive industry consisting of a continuum of rms of mass 1 that are risk-neutral
and initially homogeneous in abatement costs. The rms are required to make two dichotomous
decisions: whether to adopt a new abatement technology to reduce emissions at a lower cost
and whether to comply with the emission standard q. We assume that the adoption decisions
made by rms are observable by the regulator. However, the emissions and compliance status of
rms can only be known by the regulatory agency through costly monitoring. Like Harrington
(1988), we focus on the behavior of a regulatory agency whose primary goal is enforcement and
not social welfare maximization. Thus, we specify the goal of the regulatory agency as minimizing
the resources devoted to monitoring and enforcement consistent with achieving a given compliance
rate with the emission standard q without modeling the policy process through which the level of
3Arguedas (2013) analyzes whether it is socially desirable that nes for exceeding pollution standards depend on
the rms level of investment in environmentally friendly technologies. Unlike this paper, she considers a static partial
equilibrium framework and focuses on the e¤ects of nes instead of auditing. Coria and Villegas (2014) analyze the
advisability of targeted enforcement of emissions taxes in a static setting. They show that the regulator can reduce
aggregate emissions by engaging in a regulatory deal where a reduced monitoring probability is granted in exchange
for adoption of new technology.
4
the standard is chosen.4
Let the abatement cost function of an individual rm be denoted c(q), which is strictly convex
and decreasing in the level of emissions q. The new technology allows rms to abate emissions
at a lower cost c(q), where  2 (0; 1) is a parameter that represents the drop in abatement cost
obtained by adopting the new technology. After making the adoption decision, rms decide on the
compliance or violation of the standard q. We assume that after monitoring a rm, the regulator is
able to perfectly determine the rms compliance status. If the monitoring reveals that the rm is
non-compliant, it faces a convex penalty (q   q) > 0. For zero violation, the penalty is zero (0),
yet the marginal penalty is greater than zero 0(0) > 0.5
Harrington considers two groups of rms: the non-target group (G1), which faces less stringent
enforcement, and the target group (G2), where scrutiny is high. Let 1 and 2 denote the prob-
abilities that the regulator audits a rm in G1 and G2, respectively, where these probabilities are
common knowledge among rms, and 1 < 2. Moreover, rms can move from G1 to G2 according
to transition probabilities that depend on the adoption status, current state of the system and
compliance with the emission standard (see Table 1).
Adopters
Comply Violate
GA1 G
A
2 G
A
1 G
A
2
GA1 1 0 1  A A
GA2 A 1  A 0 1
Non-adopters
Comply Violate
GNA1 G
NA
2 G
NA
1 G
NA
2
GNA1 1 0 1  NA NA
GNA2 NA 1  NA 0 1
Table 1: Transition matrices for adopters and non-adopters
Let GA1 (G
NA
1 ) and G
A
2 (G
NA
2 ) denote the sub-group of adopters (non-adopters) in G1 and G2,
respectively. Furthermore, let A(NA) denote the probability of moving an adopter (non-adopter)
to group G2 if caught violating in group G1, and A(NA) denote the probability of moving an
4See also Garvie and Keeler (1994).
5Unlike our setting, Harrington (1988) assumes a linear penalty function, implying that the decision of whether
or not to comply with the emission standard is of the all-or-nothing type. Though such an assumption facilitates
the modeling since it provides a clear cut-o¤ policy where all detected violations are transferred to the group with
the higher monitoring probability, it might lead to unrealistic situations where rms report zero emissions and the
regulator does not monitor them.
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adopter (non-adopter) back to group G1 if discovered complying in G2. We assume that A  NA
and A  NA. In addition, we assume that A  A and NA  NA.
Thus, our framework is general enough to encompass Harringtons state-dependent enforcement
scheme (if A = NA and A = NA, and hence, our four-group targeting scheme converges to
Harringtons two-group targeting scheme) and to allow us to analyze the e¤ects of di¤erentiated
probabilities of transition to reward the rms that adopt the technologies (hereinafter denoted
targeted state-dependent enforcement where A < NA and A > NA). Finally, the framework
is also general enough to analyze the e¤ects of the allocation of adopters and non-adopters to the
target and non-target groups G1 and G2. In particular, we analyze three di¤erent initial allocations:
(1) when all rms are initially allocated to G1, (2) when all rms are initially allocated to G2, and
(3) when adopters are initially allocated to G1 and non-adopters to G2, hereinafter denoted targeted
initial allocation.6
As in Harrington (1988), the monitoring scheme poses a Markov decision problem to adopters
and non-adopters since they move from one group to the other depending on the compliance be-
havior in the previous period. For each adoption status, the rm chooses among possible strategies:
 comply when in G1 and G2,
 comply only if in G1,
 comply only if in G2,
 violate in both groups.
Let the strategy f jklm describe the rms decisions to comply with (0) or violate (1) the regula-
tion, where j and k denote the actions taken by adopters when in groups G1 and G2, respectively
and let l and m denote the actions taken by non-adopters when in groups G1 and G2, respectively.
In principle, we should have 16 possible strategies. However, since adopters compliance cost is
lower than non-adopterswithin the same group (G1 or G2), it is not reasonable that non-adopters
6Note that rms in our model are homogeneous ex-ante and hence, should comply with the regulation to the same
extent. To be consistent with this assumption, we analyze the cases where all rms are initially allocated to G1 or
G2, yet a random initial allocation of rms to G1 or G2 is also feasible. Let us consider a situation where a fraction
 of the rms are initially allocated to G1 and the remaining fraction [1  ] are initially allocated to G2. In this
case the results become a linear combinations of our results.
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comply but adopters violate. Moreover, since the expected cost of compliance in G2 is higher both
for adopters and non-adopters, it is not reasonable that they comply in G1 but violate in G2. Thus,
six potential strategies remain: f0000, f0010, f0011, f1010, f1011, and f1111. Note that the rst three
strategies imply full compliance by adopters (and varying levels of compliance by non-adopters)
and the last three strategies imply partial or full non-compliance by adopters and non-adopters.
Let EjklmA (1) and E
jklm
NA (1) denote the present value of adoptersand non-adoptersexpected
cost of strategy f jklm when initially allocated to G1. By analogy, let E
jklm
A (2) and E
jklm
NA (2) denote
the present value of adopters and non-adopters expected cost of strategy f jklm when initially
allocated to group G2. As in Harrington (1988), by the stationary property, the expected present
value must be the cost in this period plus the expected present value discounted one period. For
instance, let us compute the present values of f1010 for adopters when initially allocated to G1
and G2, respectively. In a single play of this game, if the regulator announces beforehand that the
inspection probability for an adopter is i (_ i = 1; 2), the adopterscost minimization problem
corresponds to7:
MinqA [c(qA) + i(qA   q)] s.t. qA  q:
The optimization problem can be represented by the Lagrangian L = c(qA) + i(qA   q) +
! [q   qA], where !  0 is the Lagrange multiplier. The FOC dening the optimal level of emissions
is given by:
0c(qA) + i0 [qA   q] + ! = 0: (1)
Under compliance, qA = q and ! = 0. Hence, the expected cost of the regulation is equal
to c(q). Under non-compliance (NC), adopters select an emission level qNCA > q such that
 0c(qNCA ) = i0

qNCA   q

. It holds that qNCA decreases with the monitoring probability i,
and the expected cost of the regulation is equal to c(qNCA ) + i(q
NC
A (i)   q). Let 0   < 1
be the discount factor. Since under the strategy f1010 adopters violate the standard if in G1 and
comply if in G2, the expected costs when initially allocated G1 and G2 are, respectively:
E1010A (1) =

c(qNCA (1)) + 1(q
NC
A (1)  q)

+ 

1AE
1010
A (2) + [1  1A]E1010A (1)

;(2)
E1010A (2) = [c(q)] + 

2AE
1010
A (1) + [1  2A]E1010A (2)

: (3)
7For non-adopters  = 1.
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The second term in parentheses in equation (2) represents the expected present value discounted
one period. It is composed of the expected cost of being caught in violation in G1 and sent to G2
with probability 1A plus the expected cost of remaining in G1 with probability [1  1A]. By
analogy, the second term in parentheses in equation (3) represents the discounted expected present
value of being found in compliance in G2 and sent to G1 with probability 2A plus the expected
cost of remaining in G2 with probability [1  2A] :
Solving equations (2) and (3) simultaneously yields:
E1010A (1) =
c(qNCA (1)) + 1(q
NC
A (1)  q)
1   +
1A

c(q)  c(qNCA (1)) + 1(qNCA (1)  q)
[1  ] [1   + 1A + 2A]
;
E1010A (2) =
c(q)
1    
2A

c(q)  c(qNCA (1)) + 1(qNCA (1)  q)
[1  ] [1   + 1A + 2A]
:
Table 2 presents solutions to the sets of simultaneous equations giving the present values of
each feasible strategy f jklm. Note that the expected cost for those cases where rms are moved
from one group to the other comprises two terms. The rst term represents the expected cost if
the rm remains in the initial group forever. The second term is an adjustment factor that reects
the likelihood of the rm being moved to the other group. This adjustment factor is positive if the
expected cost is greater in the other group and negative otherwise.8
Note also that regardless of the initial allocation, the transition probabilities (NA; NA) only
a¤ect non-adoptersexpected costs of compliance. By analogy, the transition probabilities (A; A)
only a¤ect adoptersexpected costs of compliance. Morever, like in Harrington (1988), an increased
probability A(NA) of transiting an adopter (non-adopter) to group G2 if caught violating in group
G1 increases adopters(non-adopters) expected costs of compliance, while the reverse holds for the
probability A(NA) of moving an adopter (non-adopter) back to group G1 if discovered complying
in G2.
8This is consistent with Friesen (2003).
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Adopters
Initially in G1
00 c(q)1 
10 c(q
NC
A (1))+1(q
NC
A (1) q)
1  +
1A[c(q) [c(qNCA (1))+1(qNCA (1) q)]]
[1 ][1 +1A+2A]
11 c(q
NC
A (1))+1(q
NC
A (1) q)
1 +1A +
1A[c(qNCA (2))+2(q
NC
A (2) q)]
[1 ][1 +1A]
Initially in G2
00 c(q)1 
10 c(q)1   
2A[c(q) [c(qNCA (1))+1(qNCA (1) q)]]
[1 ][1 +1A+2A]
11 c(q
NC
A (2))+2(q
NC
A (2) q)
1 
Non-adopters
Initially in G1
00 c(q)1 
10 c(q
NC
NA(1))+1(q
NC
NA(1) q)
1  +
1NA[c(q) [c(qNCNA(1))+1(qNCNA(1) q)]]
[1 ][1 +1NA+2NA]
11 c(q
NC
NA(1))+1(q
NC
NA(1) q)
1 +1NA +
1NA[c(qNCNA(2))+2(q
NC
NA(2) q)]
[1 ][1 +1A]
Initially in G2
00 c(q)1 
01 c(q)1  
2NA[c(q) [c(qNCA (1))+1(qNCA (1) q)]]
[1 ][1 +1A+2A]
11 c(q
NC
NA(2))+2(q
NC
NA(2) q)
1 
Table 2: Expected costs of compliance for adopters and non-adopters
Finally, as in Harrington (1988), there are critical probabilities 1 and 2 that dene which
strategy is optimal for the rms. In our case, let A1 (
NA
1 ) and 
A
2 (
NA
2 ) denote the critical
probabilities 1 and 2 that make adopters (non-adopters) indi¤erent between compliance and
violation when in G1 and G2, respectively. A1 and 
A
2 are independent of the initial allocation of
adopters and non-adopters to G1 and G2 and are implicitly dened by the equations:


c(q)  c(qNCA (A1 )

= A1 (q
NC
A (
A
1 )  q); (4)


c(q)  c(qNCA (A2 )
    = A2 (qNCA (A2 )  q); (5)
where   =
A2 A[[c(q) c(qNCA (1)] 1(qNCA (1) q)]
[1 +1A+A2 A]
. In the case of imperfect compliance, 1 < A1 ,
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and hence   > 0. Thus, A2 is implicitly dened by equation (5), and it is a non-linear function of
1, A, and A. As shown in Appendix A, it holds that 
A
2 increases when 1 or A increases, and it
decreases when A increases. Vis-a-vis Harringtons enforcement scheme, targeted state-dependent
enforcement reduces A2 since A < NA and A > NA. From equations (4) and (5), it can also
be seen that the larger the reduction in abatement costs due to the adoption of the new technology
(i.e., the lower the parameter ), the lower the critical probabilities A1 and 
A
2 . In other words,
the more e¢ cient the new technology is, the higher the incentives for adopters to comply.
Similar equations dene the probabilities NA1 and 
NA
2 for  = 1 and emission levels q
NC
NA(
NA
1 )
and qNCNA(
NA
2 ). Since for the same monitoring probability the expected costs of compliance are
lower for non-adopters, the minimum monitoring probability necessary to ensure compliance is
lower for adopters than for non-adopters, A1 < 
NA
1 and 
A
2 < 
NA
2 .
Given these critical probabilities, the optimal strategy f can be characterized as:
f =
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
f0000 if 1 > NA1 and 2 > 
NA
2 ,
f0010 if 1 2

A1 ; 
NA
1

and 2 > NA2 ,
f0011 if 1 2

A1 ; 
NA
1

and 2 2

A2 ; 
NA
2

,
f1010 if 1 < A1 and 2 > 
NA
2 ,
f1011 if 1 < A1 and 2 2

A2 ; 
NA
2

,
f1111 if 1 < A1 and 2 < 
A
2 .
3 The Adoption Rate
We assume that buying and installing the new technology implies a xed cost that di¤ers among
rms.9 Let ki denote the xed cost of adoption for rm i, and assume that ki is uniformly distributed
on the interval (k; k). Note that the di¤erences EjklmNA (1) EjklmA (1) and EjklmNA (2) EjklmA (2) indicate
how compliance costs change with the use of new technologies when rms are initially allocated
to G1 and G2, respectively and the di¤erence E
jklm
NA (2) EjklmA (1) indicates how compliance costs
9The assumption that adoption costs di¤er among rms is not new in the literature analyzing the e¤ects of
choice of policy instruments on the rate of adoption of new technologies; see, e.g., Requate and Unold (2001). On
the other hand, Stoneman and Ireland (1983) point out that although most theoretical and empirical literature on
technological adoption focuses on the demand side alone, supply-side forces might be very important in explaining
patterns of adoption in practice. Thus, e.g., costs of acquiring new technology might vary among rms due to rm
characteristics, e.g., location and output, or competition among suppliers of capital goods.
10
change under a targeted allocation based on adoption status. Any rm whose saving in total
expected cost o¤sets its adoption cost will adopt the new technology. For a given strategy f jklm
and initial allocation of non-adopters and adopters to groups y and x, respectively, where y; x = 1; 2,
and y  x, the rate of rms  2 [0; 1] adopting the more e¢ cient abatement technology is dened
by:
jklm(y j x) =
Z bk
k
f(ki)dk = F (bki) =  hEjklmNA (y)  EjklmA (x)i  &; (6)
where the RHS of equation (6) follows from the denition of the uniform cumulative distribution
of ki,  = 1k kand & =  k. For simplicity, we assume hereinafter that & ' 0. Thus, the adoption
rate is a function of the shift in abatement costs , the emission standard q, the initial allocation
of adopters and non-adopters to G1 or G2, the monitoring probabilities (1; 2), and the transition
probabilities (A; NA) and (A; NA). In addition,  is inversely related to the length of the
investment cost interval (k   k). 10
In what follows, we analyze the impact of the targeted state-dependent enforcement strategy
on the rate of adoption through comparative statics with respect to the transition probabilities
A; NA; A, and NA (see Appendix B for detailed comparative statics of adopters and non-
adoptersexpected costs of compliance with regard to the transition probabilities).
Proposition 1 A targeted state-dependent enforcement scheme spurs the rate of adoption of the
environmentally friendy technology.
Recall that jklm(y j x) =  
h
EjklmNA (y)  EjklmA (x)
i
_ y; x = 1; 2; and y  x, and that the
transition probabilities NA and NA (A and A) only a¤ect non-adopters(adopters) expected
costs of compliance. Hence,
@jklm(y j x)
@NA
=  
@EjklmNA (y)
@NA
 0;
@jklm(y j x)
@NA
=  
@EjklmNA (y)
@NA
 0:
Furthermore,
10The more heterogeneous the rms are in terms of the investment cost, the larger the interval (k   k) and the
lower the rate of adoption.
11
@jklm(y j x)
@A
=   @E
jklm
NA (x)
@A
 0;
@jklm(y j x)
@A
=   @E
jklm
NA (x)
@A
 0:
Thus, targeted state-dependent enforcement where NA > A and NA < A induces a larger rate
of adoption than Harringtons scheme based only on past compliance.
As shown in Appendix B, marginal variations in (NA; NA) have a larger e¤ect on the rate
of adoption than do marginal variations in (A; A) in almost all cases. Moreover, the marginal
e¤ects of (A; NA) on the rate of adoption are larger when rms are initially allocated to G1. The
reverse holds for (A; NA); their marginal e¤ects on the rate of adoption are larger when rms are
initially allocated to G2.
As mentioned above, since enforcement is more stringent in G2, it holds that E
jklm
A (2) 
EjklmA (1) and E
jklm
NA (2)  EjklmNA (1), where equality holds only in the case where adopters/non-
adopters fully comply with the regulation. Therefore, we can derive the following proposition
regarding the e¤ects of a targeted initial allocation on the rate of adoption.
Proposition 2 The rate of adoption of the environmentally friendy technology under a targeted
state dependent enforcement scheme is larger if the regulator also targets the initial allocation of
rms based on adoption status.
Given equation (6), the di¤erence in adoption rate between targeted initial allocation and the
allocation where all rms are initially sent to G1 corresponds to:
jklm(2 j 1)  jklm(2 j 2) =  
h
EjklmA (2)  EjklmA (1)
i
 0:
This di¤erence is equal to zero under full compliance by non-adopters, and positive otherwise.
By analogy, the di¤erence in adoption rate between targeted initial allocation and the allocation
where all rms are initially sent to G2 corresponds to:
jklm(2 j 1)  jklm(1 j 1) =  
h
EjklmNA (2)  EjklmNA (1)
i
 0:
This di¤erence is equal to zero under full compliance by adopters, and positive otherwise.
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Hence, compared with the allocations where all rms are sent to G1 or G2, targeted initial
allocation leads to a higher rate of adoption. Thus, our results suggest that to speed up the pace of
adoption of environmentally friendly technologies, the regulator should exert a stronger monitoring
pressure on non-adopters. This result goes against previous studies of targeted enforcement policy in
a static setting that suggest exerting a stronger monitoring pressure on rms with lower abatement
cost since their pollution levels are more responsive to the enforcement parameters than those of
rms with higher abatement cost (e.g., Garvie and Keeler (1994) Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo
(2006)). Since in their analysis the rate of adoption is exogenous, they do not consider that biasing
the monitoring scheme against rms with lower abatement costs reduces the potential gains from
investing in new technologies, and hence, discourages adoption. A similar argument applies in the
case of industrial turnover. Stringent regulations that only apply to newer or cleaner rms might
slow down the turnover of pollution sources, drive up the cost of environmental protection, and
increase pollution levels since they provide existing sources with perverse incentives to continue
operating while taxingnewer and cleaner entrants. See, e.g., Maloney and Brady (1988).
4 Individual and Aggregate Expected Emissions
Let bqjklmA (y) and bqjklmNA (y) to denote the expected emissions by adopters and non-adopters under
strategy jklm when initially allocated to group y = 1; 2. Table 3 presents the summary of expected
emissions by adopters and non-adopters under di¤erent strategies.
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Adopters
f Initially in G1 Initially in G2
00 q1 
q
1 
10
[1 +2A]qNCA (1)+1Aq
[1 ][1 +1A+2A]
q
1 +
2A[qNCA (1) q]
[1 ][1 +1A+2A]
11
qNCA (1)
1 +1A+
1Aq
NC
A (2)
[1 ][1 +1A]
qNCA (2)
1 
Non-adopters
f Initially in G1 Initially in G2
00 q1 
q
1 
10
[1 +2NA]qNCNA(1)+1NAq
[1 ][1 +1NA+2NA]
q
1 +
2NA[qNCNA(1) q]
[1 ][1 +1NA+2NA]
11
qNCNA(1)
1 +1NA+
1NAq
NC
NA(2)
[1 ][1 +1NA]
qNCNA(2)
1 
Table 3: Expected emissions by adopters and non-adopters
As expected, comparing the columns of Table 3 shows that (except for the case of full compli-
ance) expected emissions by adopters and non-adopters are larger if rms are initially allocated to
G1. Furthermore, if A = NA and A = NA, expected emissions are higher for non-adopters
than adopters in all cases, i.e., bqjklmNA (y)  bqjklmA (y) _ jklm and y = 1; 2:
For a given strategy and initial allocation of non-adopters and adopters to groups y and x,
respectively, aggregate expected emissions can be represented as:
bQ(y j x) = (y j x)bqA(x) + [1  (y j x)] bqNA(y): (7)
By varying the transition probabilities (A; NA; A; NA) we have two types of e¤ects on
aggregate emissions: a direct e¤ect on adoptersor non-adoptersemissions, and an indirect e¤ect
on the rate of adoption. As shown in detail in Appendix C, increased probabilities (A; NA) have
the positive e¤ect of reducing emissions by adopters and non-adopters, respectively. In contrast,
increased probabilities (A; NA) have a negative e¤ect, leading to increased emissions. Therefore,
targeted state-dependent enforcement has the positive e¤ect of reducing emissions by means of
enhancing the rate of adoption (and thus changing the composition of rms towards a larger
fraction of cleaner rms). Furthermore, it has the positive (direct) e¤ect of reducing non-adopters
emissions. Nevertheless, in some cases, this might come at the expense of increased emissions by
adopters.
14
Proposition 3 A targeted state-dependent enforcement scheme based on rms past compliance
and adoption of environmentally superior technologies can reduce aggregate emissions.
Let us for a moment disregard the e¤ects of the initial allocation of rms to G1 or G2. Let
the supercripts T and H denote the outcomes of targeted state-dependent and Harringtons en-
forcement, respectively. Given equation (7), the di¤erence in expected emissions between the two
enforcement schemes corresponds to:
bQT   bQH = T   H bqHA   bqHNA+ 1  T  bqTNA   bqHNA+ T bqTA   bqHA  : (8)
Note that the rst term in brackets on the RHS of equation (8) is negative and corresponds
to the e¤ect of targeted state-dependent enforcement increasing the rate of adoption (vis-a-vis
Harringtons enforcement), and thus reducing expected aggregate emissions as adopters emit less
than non-adopters. The second term is also negative and corresponds to the reduced emissions by
non-adopters, which are monitored more stringently under targeted state-dependent enforcement
and hence emit less. Finally, the third term is positive and corresponds to the increased emissions
by adopters, which are monitored less stringently under targeted state-dependent enforcement and
hence emit more.
Regardless the initial allocation, bqTA = bqHA under the strategies f0000, f0010 and f0011, implying
that equation (8) simplies to:
bQT   bQH = T   H bqHA   bqHNA+ 1  T  bqTNA   bqHNA  0:
This di¤erence is equal to zero under f0000 and negative under f0010 and f0011. Hence, ag-
gregate emissions under targeted state-dependent enforcement are lower or equal to those under
Harringtons enforcement. The comparison is less clear for the strategies f1010, f1011 and f1111.
In what follows, let us consider how targeted state-dependent enforcement a¤ects adoptersand
non-adoptersemissions (that is, the second and third term of equation (8); see Appendix C for
detailed comparative statics) under these three strategies.
 f1010. We have that the marginal e¤ects of the probabilities NA and NA are larger than
the marginal e¤ects of the probabilities A and A. Hence, vis-a-vis Harringtons enforce-
ment, targeted state-dependent enforcement increases adoptersand reduces non-adopters
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emissions. The overall e¤ect is a net reduction in emissions as the reduction in non-adopters
emissions is larger than the increase in adopterss emissions regardless the initial allocation.
 f1011. A targeted state-dependent enforcement increases adoptersemissions. In contrast, it
has no e¤ect on non-adoptersemissions if they are initially allocated to G2 and reduces non-
adoptersemissions if they are initially allocated to G1. The overall e¤ect is a net increase
in emissions as the increase in adopters emissions is larger than (any) reduction in non-
adopterss emissions regardless the initial allocation.
 f1111. A targeted state-dependent enforcement has no e¤ect on adoption or on adoptersand
non-adoptersemissions when rms are initially allocated to G2. Hence bQT   bQH = 0 in such
case. If rms are initially allocated to G1, it increases adoptersand reduces non-adopters
emissions. The overall e¤ect is a net reduction of emissions as the reduction of non-adopters
emissions is larger than the increase in adopterss emissions.
Thus, we can say that vis-a-vis Harringtons enforcement, targeted state-dependent enforce-
ment has no e¤ect on emissions under full compliance by adopters and non-adopters, while it
unambiguously reduces emissions under the strategies f0010, f0011, and f1010. If all rms are
initially allocated to G1, it also reduces emissions under f1111. Finally, whether or not targeted
dependent enforcement leads to lowered emissions under f1011 depends on the relative magnitude
of the direct and indirect e¤ects. Even if adopterss emissions might be larger than those under
Harringtons enforcement, adopters emit less than non-adopters. Hence, aggregate emissions under
targeted state-depedent enforcement can be still lower than under Harringtons enforcement due
to the larger rate of adoption.
When it comes to the expected aggregate violations, note that if rms were to always comply
with the regulation, their expected emissions would be equal to q1  . Thus, for a given strategy
and initial allocation of non-adopters and adopters to groups y and x, respectively, the expected
aggregate violations bV can be represented as:
bV (y j x) = bQ(y j x)  q
1   :
Hence, it is clear that if targeted state-dependent enforcement reduces expected aggregate
emissions, it also reduces expected aggregate violations.
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Let us now analyze the e¤ects of a targeted initial allocation on aggregate emissions.
Proposition 4 Expected aggregate emissions under targeted initial allocation are lower than the
expected aggregate emissions under an allocation that initially sends all rms to G1. If the increase
in adoption rate due to targeted initial allocation is su¢ ciently large, the expected aggregate emis-
sions under targeted initial allocation are also lower than the expected aggregate emissions under
an allocation that initially sends all rms to G2.
Given equation (7), the di¤erence in expected aggregate emissions between targeted initial
allocation and the allocation where all rms are initially sent to G1 corresponds to:
bQ(2 j 1)  bQ(1 j 1) = [(2 j 1)  (1 j 1)] [bqA(1)  bqNA(1)] + [1  (2 j 1)] [bqNA(2)  bqNA(1)] : (9)
Note that the rst term in brackets on the RHS of equation (9) is negative and corresponds to
the e¤ect of a targeted initial allocation increasing the rate of adoption, and thus reducing expected
aggregate emissions as adopters emit less than non-adopters. The second term is also negative and
corresponds to the reduced emissions by non-adopters, which are monitored more stringently under
targeted initial allocation and hence emit less. So, compared with the case where both adopters
and non-adopters are allocated to G1, a targeted initial allocation would not only lead to a higher
adoption rate, but also to lower expected aggregate emissions.
The di¤erence in expected aggregate emissions between a targeted initial allocation and the
allocation where all rms are initially sent to G2 corresponds to:
bQ(2 j 1)  bQ(2 j 2) = [(2 j 1)  (2 j 2)] [bqA(2)  bqNA(2)] + (2 j 1) [bqA(1)  bqA(2)] : (10)
As before, the rm term in brackets on the RHS of equation (10) is negative and corresponds to
the e¤ect of targeted initiall allocation increasing the rate of adoption, and thus reducing expected
aggregate emissions as adopters emit less than non-adopters. The second term is positive and
corresponds to the increased emissions by adopters under targeted initial allocation: if adopters
would have been initially allocated to G2, they would have emitted bqA(2) instead of bqA(1). Since
these two e¤ects have di¤erent signs, the nal e¤ect of the initial allocation on expected aggregate
emissions depends on their relative magnitude. Let us nd the conditions for when bQ(2 j 1)  bQ(2 j
2)  0. We have two cases:
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 bqA(1) = bqA(2), which occurs under full compliance by adopters.
 bqA(1)  bqA(2) > 0, and (2j1) (2j2)(2j1)  bqA(1) bqA(2)bqNA(2) bqA(2) :
That is, if the increase in adoption rate due to a targeted initial allocation (2 j 1)   (2 j 2)
is su¢ ciently large, the expected aggregate emissions can be lower than when adopters and non-
adopters are initially allocated to G2.
5 Enforcement Costs
As Harrington (1988), we assume that the regulator wishes to minimize the resources devoted
to monitoring and enforcement consistent with achieving a target compliance rate. For a given
cost per visit for the regulatory agency equal to m (that does not di¤er between adopters and
non-adopters)11, we compute the expected costs of enforcing compliance among adopters and non-
adopters for each strategy f jklm and initial allocations to G1 and G2. These costs are denoted asbmjklmA (y) and bmjklmNA (y), respectively. Results are presented in Table 4.
11Millock et al. (2002) and Millock et al. (2012) analyze the incentives provided by di¤erent policy instruments for
the adoption of new environmental monitoring technologies. Like in our study, in these studies the choice of installing
a technology separates agents into two categories, yet their focus is on the optimal choice and stringency of policy
instruments while ours is on di¤erentiated monitoring probabilities. Furthermore, unlike our study, in these studies
adoption of technological monitoring devices serves the purpose of transforming non-point sources into point sources,
thus reducing the monitoring cost m.
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Adopters
f Initially in G1 Initially in G2
00 m11 
m2
1 +2A +
2Am1
[1 ][1 +2A]
10 m1[1 ] +
1Am[2 1]
[1 ][1 +1A+2A]
m2
1    2Am[2 1][1 ][1 +1A+2A]
11 m11 +1A+
1Am2
[1 ][1 +1A]
m2
1 
Non-adopters
f Initially in G1 Initially in G2
00 m11 
m2
1 +2NA +
2NAm1
[1 ][1 +2NA]
10 m1[1 ] +
1NAm[2 1]
[1 ][1 +1NA+2NA]
m2
1    2NAm[2 1][1 ][1 +1NA+2NA]
11 m11 +1NA+
1NAm2
[1 ][1 +1NA]
m2
1 
Table 4: Expected cost of enforcing adopters and non-adopters
Since by construction we target surveillance resources to non-adopters, it is not surprising to
see that bmjklmNA (y)  bmjklmA (y), where equality holds only in the case where adopters/non-adopters
fully comply with the regulation. Moreover, since enforcement is more stringent in G2, it holds
that bmjklmA (2)  bmjklmA (1) and bmjklmNA (2)  bmjklmNA (1):
For a given strategy and initial allocation of non-adopters and adopters to groups y and x,
respectively, the total expected enforcement cost can be characterized as:
cM(y j x) = [(y j x)bmA(x) + [1  (y j x)] bmNA(y)] (11)
Like in the case of expected aggregate emissions, varying the transition probabilities creates
two types of e¤ects: a direct e¤ect on enforcement cost, and an indirect e¤ect on the rate of
adoption. As shown in detail in Appendix D, increased probabilities (A; NA) increase the cost
of enforcing compliance among adopters and non-adopters, respectively. In contrast, increased
probabilities probabilities (A; NA) reduce the cost of enforcing compliance of adopters and non-
adopters. Therefore, a targeted state-dependent enforcement has the positive indirect e¤ect of
reducing the total expected enforcement cost by means of enhancing the rate of adoption (and thus
changing the composition of rms towards a larger fraction of rms whose cost of enforcement is
lower). Nevertheless, this comes at the expense of an increased cost of enforcing compliance among
non-adopters.
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Proposition 5 A targeted state-dependent enforcement scheme based on rms past compliance
and adoption of environmentally superior technologies can reduce the total expected cost of enforcing
an emission standard.
Let us disregard for the moment the e¤ects of the initial allocation of rms to G1 or G2.
Let the supercripts T and H denote the outcomes of targeted state-dependent and Harringtons
enforcement, respectively. Given equation (11) and since under Harringtons enforcement the cost
of enforcing compliance among adopters and non-adopters is the same, the di¤erence in the total
expected cost of enforcing an emission standard between the two enforcement schemes corresponds
to:
cMT   cMH = T  bmTA   bmHA + 1  T   bmTNA   bmHNA : (12)
The rst term in brackets on the RHS of equation (12) is negative and corresponds to the lowered
expected cost of enforcing compliance among adopters who are monitored less stringently under
targeted state-dependent enforcement. The second term is positive and corresponds to the increased
expected of enforcing compliance among non-adopters who are monitored more stringently under
targeted state-dependent enforcement. Since these two e¤ects have di¤erent signs, the sign of
the di¤erence in (12) depends on their relative magnitude. Let us nd the conditions for whencMT   cMH  0. We have:
T
1  T 
bmHA   bmTAbmTNA   bmHNA : (13)
That is, if the adoption rate induced by targeted state-dependent enforcement is su¢ ciently large,
this enforcement scheme can reduce the total expected cost of enforcing an emission standard vis-
a-vis Harringtons enforcement. How large must the adoption rate be to induce a reduced expected
cost of enforcing the standard? The answer depends on how targeted state dependent enforcement
a¤ects adoptersand non-adoptersenforcement cost. Let us analyze the e¤ects of targeted state
dependent enforcement under each feasible strategy when all rms are initially allocated to G1
by means of comparative statics with respect to the transition probabilities (see Appendix D for
detailed comparative statics).
 f0000. We have that bmTA = bmHA = bmTNA = bmHNA and hence, cMT   cMH = 0 regardless of T .
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 f0010 and f0011. Targeted state dependent enforcement has no e¤ect in the cost of en-
forcing compliance among adopters and increases the cost of enforcing compliance among
non-adopters, and hence cMT   cMH > 0 regardless of T .
 f1010, f1011 and f1111. Targeted state dependent enforcement reduces the cost of enforc-
ing compliance among adopters and increases the cost of enforcing compliance among non-
adopters. If condition (13) holds, the overall e¤ect is however a net reduction in the cost of
enforcement as the reduction in the enforcement cost for adopters is larger than the increase
in the enforcement cost for non-adopters.
Let us assume now that all rms are initially allocated to G2
 f0000, f0010, f0011 and f1010. Targeted state dependent enforcement reduces the cost of
enforcing compliance among adopters and increases the cost of enforcing compliance among
non-adopters. If condition (13) holds, the overall e¤ect is however a net reduction in the
cost of enforcement as the reduction in the enforcement cost for adopters is larger than the
increase in the enforcement cost for non-adopters.
 f1011. Targeted state dependent enforcement reduces the cost of enforcing compliance among
adopters and has no e¤ect in the cost of enforcing compliance among non-adopters, and hencecMT   cMH < 0 regardless of T .
 f1111. We have that bmTA = bmHA = bmTNA = bmHNA and hence, cMT   cMH = 0 regardless of T .
Thus, we can say that targeted state-dependent enforcement leads to a reduced cost of enforce-
ment under f1011 if all rms are initially allocated to G2. Provided condition (13) holds, it has
no e¤ect or the positive e¤ect of reducing the cost of enforcement under f0000 , f1010, f1011 and
f1011. Finally, whether or not targeted state-dependent enforcement leads to lowered enforcement
costs under f0010 and f0011 depends on the initial allocation. In particular, the expected cost of
enforcement is not lower than Harringtons when all rms are initially allocated to G1.
In sum, even if the cost of enforcing compliance among non-adopters might be larger under
targeted state-dependent enforcement than under Harringtons enforcement, the fact that targeted
state-dependent enforcement changes the composition of rms towards a larger fraction of rms for
which the cost of enforcement is lower implies that its total enforcement cost can be still lower if
the adoption rate is su¢ ciently large.
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Proposition 6 The expected enforcement costs under targeted initial allocation are lower than the
expected enforcement costs under an allocation that initially sends all rms to G2. If the increase
in adoption rate due to targeted initial allocation is su¢ ciently large, the expected enforcement
costs under targeted initial allocation are also lower than the expected enforcement costs under an
allocation that initially sends all rms to G1.
Given equation (11), the di¤erence in expected enforcement costs between targeted initial allo-
cation and the allocation where all rms are initially sent to G1 corresponds to:
cM(2 j 1)  cM(1 j 1) = [(2 j 1)  (1 j 1)] [bmA(1)  bmNA(1)] + [1  (2 j 1)] [bmNA(2)  bmNA(1)] :
(14)
The rst term in brackets on the RHS of equation (14) is negative and corresponds to the e¤ect
of targeted initial allocation increasing the rate of adoption, and thus reducing the expected cost of
enforcement as adopters demand less surveillance resources than non-adopters. The second term
is positive and corresponds to the increased expected of enforcing compliance among non-adopters
who are monitored more stringently under targeted initial allocation. Since these two e¤ects have
di¤erent signs, the nal e¤ect of the initial allocation on the expected enforcement cost depends
on their relative magnitude. Let us nd the conditions for when cM(2 j 1) cM(1 j 1)  0. We have
two cases:
 cM(2 j 1)  cM(1 j 1) = 0 when bmA(1) = bmNA(1), and (2 j 1) = 1.
 cM(2 j 1)  cM(1 j 1) < 0 when bmA(1)  bmNA(1) < 0, and (2j1) (1j1)1 (2j1)  bmNA(2) bmNA(1)bmNA(1) bmA(1) :
That is, if the increase in adoption rate (2 j 1)   (1 j 1) due to targeted initial allocation
is su¢ ciently large, the total enforcement cost can be lower than when both adopters and non-
adopters are initially allocated to G1.
The di¤erence in the expected enforcement cost between targeted initial allocation and the
allocation where all rms are initially sent to G2 corresponds to:
cM(2 j 1)  cM(2 j 2) = [(2 j 1)  (2 j 2)] [bmA(2)  bmNA(2)] + (2 j 1) [bmA(1)  bmA(2)] : (15)
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As before, the rst term in brackets on the RHS of equation (15) corresponds to the e¤ect of
targeted initial allocation increasing the rate of adoption, and thus reducing the expected cost of
enforcement as adopters demand less surveillance resources than non-adopters. The second terms
corresponds to the reduction in the cost of monitoring adopters; under targeted initial allocation
adopters cause an expected enforcement cost of to bmA(1) instead of bmA(2). Hence, compared with
when both adopters and non-adopters are allocated to G2, targeted initial allocation would not
only lead to a higher adoption rate but also to a lower expected enforcement cost.
6 Numerical Simulations
In this section we present a numerical example of the e¤ects of the targeted state-depedent en-
forcement on the adoption rate, aggregated emissions and total monitoring cost. In line with the
assumptions of the model, let the abatement cost function be given by c(q) = c0   c1q + c22 q2,
where c0(q) = c2q   c1 < 0, and c00(q) = c2 > 0. The penalty function is given by (q   q) =
'1(q   q) + '2(q q)
2
2 , where 
0(q   q) = '1 + '2(q   q) > 0, and 00(q   q) = '2 > 0. Then, given
a monitoring probability i _ i = 1; 2, the emission levels qNCA (i) and qNCNA(i) in a single play of
this game are given by:12
qNCA (i) = q +
 [c1   c2q]  i'1
i'2 + c2
;
qNCNA(i) = q +
[c1   c2q]  i'1
i'2 + c2
:
Let c0 = 50, c1 = 10, and c2 = 1. Moreover, let  = 0:65, which implies that technology
adoption allows for a 35% reduction in the abatement cost. The total number of rms is set at
n = 100. The cost of adopting the new technology is assumed to be uniformily distributed in the
interval [20; 100]. The emission standard is set at q = 5. The coe¢ cients for the penalty functions
are set at '1 = 20 and '2 = 1 and the discount factor is set at  = 0:95. Finally, the unitary
inspection cost m is equal to 1. Regarding the stringency of the enforcement scheme, we assume
that 1 = 0:15 and 2 = 0:5. Moreover, under a two-group enforcement scheme, A = NA = 0:5,
and A = NA = 0:25. Under a targeted state-dependent enforcement, A = 0:4, NA = 0:6,
A = 0:35, and NA = 0:15.
12See equation (1).
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Table 5 presents the adoption rate, expected aggregate emissions, and expected total enforce-
ment cost under targeted state-dependent enforcement and a two-group enforcement scheme for
each feasible strategy when all rms are initially allocated to G1 and G2. Table 6 compares the
outcomes of both enforcement schemes under targeted initial allocation where non-adopters are
initially allocated to G2 and adopters to G1.
Two Groups Four Groups
f Initial Allocation  bQ cM  bQ cM
0000 (1 j 1) 0.844 10000 300.00 0.844 10000 300.00
(2 j 2) 0.844 10000 507.41 0.844 10000 469.56
0010 (1 j 1) 0.538 11130 396.00 0.589 10839 419.04
(2 j 2) 0.629 10639 571.72 0.694 10367 552.73
0011 (1 j 1) 0.664 10481 438.02 0.683 10406 439.88
(2 j 2) 0.844 10000 584.38 0.844 10000 545.94
1010 (1 j 1) 0.545 11352 507.81 0.596 11118 503.91
(2 j 2) 0.633 10827 653.65 0.700 10626 629.53
1011 (1 j 1) 0.671 10766 574.71 0.691 10738 537.37
(2 j 2) 0.849 10262 706.09 0.850 10323 638.12
1111 (1 j 1) 0.668 10648 711.34 0.688 10602 694.37
(2 j 2) 0.844 10000 1000 0.844 10000 1000
Table 5: Targeted state-dependent enforcement vs. a two-group targeting scheme
As expected, when adopters and non-adopters fully comply with the regulation, there are no
di¤erences in adoption rate or expected aggregate emissions between targeted state-depedent en-
forcement and a two-group enforcement scheme regardless of the initial allocation. Nevertheless,
when rms are initially allocated to G2, the cost of enforcement is lower for the targeted state-
dependent enforcement. For the remaining feasible strategies, targeted state-depedent enforcement
induces a higher rate of adoption, lower emissions, lower total enforcement cost, or a combination
of these changes.
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Two-Groups Four-Groups
f Initial Allocation  bQ cM  bQ cM
0000 (2 j 1) 0.844 10000 332.41 0.844 10000 333.00
0010 (2 j 1) 0.629 10639 431.34 0.694 10367 440.42
0011 (2 j 1) 0.844 10000 409.38 0.844 10000 409.38
1010 (2 j 1) 0.635 10907 560.97 0.702 10705 539.33
1011 (2 j 1) 0.851 10374 581.34 0.851 10421 528.30
1111 (2 j 1) 0.848 10219 755.28 0.848 10248 722.51
Table 6: Initial targeted allocation under a targeted state-dependent enforcement vs. a two-group targeting scheme
Table 6 shows that, as expected, targeted initial allocation generates less emissions than an
allocation that sends all rms to G1. If all rms are initially sent to G2, the comparison is less
clear, but we can say that aggregate emissions are higher under targeted initial allocation under
most feasible strategies. Finally, when it comes to total enforcement costs, as expected, targeted
initial allocation generates a lower total cost of enforcement than an allocation that sends all rms
to G2. If all rms are initially sent to G1, the comparison is less clear, but we can say that total
enforcement costs are higher under targeted initial allocation under most feasible strategies.
Given our choice of parameters, the critical probabilities that dene the optimal strategy are
equal to (A1 ; 
A
2 ) = (0:163; 0:290) and (
NA
1 ; 
NA
2 ) = (0:250; 0:481). Hence, the optimal strategy
corresponds to f1010. Thus, with regards to a two-group enforcement scheme, targeted state-
dependent enforcement induces a higher rate of adoption, lower emissions and lower total enforce-
ment cost under all allocations of adopters and non-adopters to the target and non-target groups
G1 and G2.
7 Conclusions
A signicant fraction of the literature on environmental regulation has focused on how environmen-
tal policies are and should be enforced. Harrington (1988) shows that a suitable strategy for the
regulator to deal with the budget constraints in the enforcement activity is to target enforcement.
Regulators can dene a monitoring schedule for rms according to their past compliance records
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or their potential emissions. If rms face a targeted enforcement strategy where those with higher
potential emissions are monitored more closely, a plausible response may be to adopt a new and
more e¢ cient abatement technology that allows them to reduce potential emissions and thus avoid
more stringent monitoring. Using a four-group targeting scheme (denoted targeted state-dependent
enforcement), we have analyzed the e¤ects of an audit framework where targeting is based only on
rmspast compliance record but also on adoption of environmentally superior technologies.
The results suggest that targeted state-dependent enforcement has a deterrent e¤ect and can
help reduce total enforcement costs. Firstly, it changes the composition of rms in the industry
toward an increased fraction of cleaner rms that pollute and violate less. Secondly, it reduces the
minimum monitoring probability required to ensure compliance by adopters. Finally, it provides
non-adopters with stronger incentives to comply since surveillance resources are targeted more
heavily to non-adopters.
The fact that the technology adoption rate is inuenced by monitoring strategy is good news for
a regulator who wants to achieve a given level of aggregate emissions but has political constraints
on the level of the emission standard to be imposed. Such a regulator may use a di¤erentiated
monitoring strategy to induce technology adoption and thereby reduce aggregate emissions for a
given politically feasible emission standard. Consequently, targeted monitoring strategies should
not be ruled out as a plausible enforcement policy if the interaction between monitoring probabilities
and technology adoption is taken into consideration.
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Appendix A
The critical probability A2 is determined by equation (5), which denes an implicit function
f(A2 ; 1; A; A) = [c(q)  c(qNCA (A2 ))]     A2 '(qNCA (A2 )  q) = 0;
where
  = A2 A



c(q)  c(qNCA (1)
  1(qNCA (1)  q)
1   + 1A + A2 A
 > 0 if 1 < A1 :
By the implicit function theorem, we have:
@A2
@1
=   @f=@1
@f=@A2
:
Di¤erentiating f(:) with respect to 1 yields:
@f
@1
=   @ 
@1
=
[1   + A2 A]A2 A'(qNCA (1)  q) + AA2 A

[c(q)  c(qNCA (1))]

[1   + 1A + A2 A]2
> 0:
Di¤erentiating f(:) with respect to 2 yields:
@f
@A2
=  '(qNCA (A2 )  q)  (1   + 1A)
 
A2 (1   + 1A + A2 A)
< 0:
Hence, @
A
2
@1
> 0.
By analogy, we di¤erentiate f(:) with respect to the transition probabilities A and A, which
yields:
@f
@A
=   @ 
@A
=
1 
1   + 1A + A2 A
> 0;
@f
@A
=   @ 
@A
==   (1   + 1A) 
A(1   + 1A + A2 A)
< 0:
Hence, @
A
2
@A
=  @f=@A
@f=@A2
> 0 and @
A
2
@A
=   @f=@A
@f=@A2
< 0:
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Appendix B
Let us compute the derivatives of adopters and non-adopters expected costs of compliance
with respect to the probabilities (A; A) and (NA; NA).
E¤ects of (A; A)
As shown in Table 2, regardless of the initial allocation, the transition probabilities (A; A)
only a¤ect adoptersexpected costs of compliance. Since under the strategies f0000; f0010 and f0011
adopters already comply, decreasing A or increasing A has no e¤ect on emissions, abatement
or rate of adoption. Thus , @E
0000
A (y)
@A
=
@E0010A (y)
@A
=
@E0011A (y)
@A
= 0, and @E
0000
A (y)
@A
=
@E0010A (y)
@A
=
@E0011A (y)
@A
= 0 _ y = 1; 2.
Instead, if the strategies f1010 or f1011 are optimal, the derivatives @E
1010
A (y)
@A
and @E
1011
A (y)
@A
are
the same, positive, and given by:
@E1010A (1)
@A
= 1 [1   + 2A]

c(q)  c(qNCA (1)) + 1(qNCA (1)  q)
[1  ] [1   + 1A + 2A]2
> 0;
@E1010A (2)
@A
=
2A
1   + 2A
@E1010A (1)
@A
> 0:
If f1111 is optimal, @E
1111
A (2)
@A
= 0. In constrast, @E
1111
A (1)
@A
> 0 and corresponds to:
@E1111A (1)
@A
= 1

c(qNCA (2)) + 2(q
NC
A (2)  q)
  c(qNCNA(1)) + 1(qNCNA(1)  q)
[1  ] [1   + 1A + 2A]2
> 0:
The derivatives @E
1010
A (y)
@A
and@E
1011
A (y)
@A
are the same, negative, and given by:
@E1010A (1)
@A
=   2A
1   + 2A
@E1010A (1)
@A
< 0;
@E1010A (2)
@A
=  2 [1   + 1A]
1A
@E1010A (2)
@A
< 0:
If policy f1111 is optimal, @E
1111
A (y)
@A
= 0, _ y = 1; 2.
In sum, from the analysis above it is clear that @E
jklm
A (y)
@A
 0 and @E
jklm
A (y)
@A
 0:
E¤ects of (NA; NA)
Note that regardless of the initial allocation, the transition probabilities (NA; NA) only a¤ect
non-adopters expected cost of compliance. Since under the policy f0000 non-adopters already
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comply, increasing NA or decreasing NA has no e¤ect on the rate of adoption. Thus,
@E0000NA (y)
@NA
=
@E0000NA (y)
@NA
= 0 _ y = 1; 2.
If the strategy f0010 or f1010 is optimal, the derivatives @E
0010
NA (y)
@NA
and@E
1010
NA (y)
@NA
are the same,
positive and given by:
@E0010NA (1)
@NA
= 1 [1   + 2NA]

c(q)  c(qNCNA(1)) + 1(qNCNA(1)  q)
[1  ] [1   + 1NA + 2NA]2
> 0;
@E0010NA (2)
@NA
=
2NA
1   + 2NA
@E0010NA (1)
@NA
> 0:
If the strategy f0011 ; f1011 or f1111 is optimal, @E
0011
NA (y)
@NA
;
@E1011NA (y)
@NA
and@E
1111
NA (y)
@NA
are the same, and
equal to zero if the rms are initially allocated to G2. In contrast, the derivatives
@E0011NA (1)
@NA
;
@E1011NA (1)
@NA
;
and@E
1111
NA (1)
@NA
are positive and given by:
@E0011NA (1)
@NA
= 1

c(qNCNA(2)) + 2(q
NC
NA(2)  q)
  c(qNCNA(1)) + 1(qNCNA(1)  q)
[1  ] [1   + 1NA + 2NA]2
> 0:
The derivatives @E
0010
NA (y)
@NA
and@E
1010
NA (y)
@NA
are the same, negative, and given by:
@E0010NA (1)
@NA
=   2NA
1   + 2NA
@E0010NA (1)
@NA
< 0;
@E0010NA (2)
@NA
=  1   + 1NA
1NA
@E0010NA (2)
@NA
< 0:
By analogy, @E
0011
NA (y)
@NA
;
@E1011NA (y)
@NA
; and@E
1111
NA (y)
@NA
are the same, and equal to zero.
In sum, from the analysis above it is clear that @E
jklm
NA (y)
@NA
 0 and @E
jklm
NA (y)
@NA
 0:
Marginal Variations in Transition Probabilities
From the analysis above, it follows that
@EjklmNA (y)@NA
  @EjklmA (y)@A
 and @EjklmNA (y)@NA
  @EjklmA (y)@A

_ jklm 6= 1011, implying that at the margin, variations on (NA; NA) have a larger e¤ect on the
rate of adoption than do marginal variations in (A; A).
Moreover, it follows that
@EjklmA (1)@A
  @EjklmA (2)@A
 and @EjklmNA (1)@NA
  @EjklmNA (2)@NA
, implying that
the marginal e¤ects of (A; NA) on the rate of adoption are larger if rms are initially allocated to
G1. The reverse holds for (A; NA), where
@EjklmA (2)@A
  @EjklmA (1)@A
, and @EjklmNA (2)@NA
  @EjklmNA (1)@NA

indicating that their marginal e¤ects on the rate of adoption are larger if rms are initially allocated
to G2.
31
Appendix C
Let us compute the derivatives of adoptersand non-adoptersexpected emissions with respect to
the probabilities (A; A) and (NA; NA). As shown in Table 3, regardless of the initial allocation,
the transition probabilities (A; A) only a¤ect adoptersexpected costs of compliance. Since under
the strategies f0000; f0010 and f0011 adopters already comply, decreasing A or increasing A has no
e¤ect on emissions, abatement or rate of adoption. In contrast, if the strategies f1010 or f1011 are
optimal, the derivatives @bq1010A (y)@A and@bq1011A (y)@A are the same _ y = 1; 2, negative, and given by:
@bq1010A (1)
@A
=
1 [1   + 2A]

q   qNCA (1)

[1  ] [1   + 1A + 2A]2
< 0;
@bq1010A (2)
@A
=
2A
1   + 2A
@bq1010A (1)
@A
< 0:
If the strategy f1111 is optimal, @bq1111A (2)@A = 0. In contrast @bq1111A (1)@A is given by:
@bq1111A (1)
@A
=
1

qNCA (2)  qNCA (1)

[1   + 1A]2
< 0:
The derivatives @bq1010A (y)@A and@bq1011A (y)@A are the same _ y = 1; 2, positive, and given by:
@bq1010A (1)
@A
=
2A
1   + 2A
@bq1010A (1)
@A
> 0;
@bq1010A (2)
@A
=
2 [1   + 1A]
1 [1   + 2A]
@bq1010A (1)
@A
> 0:
If the policy f1111 is optimal, @bq1010A (2)@A = 0, _ y = 1; 2.
Regarding the transition probabilities (NA; NA), since under f
0000 non-adopters already com-
ply, increasing NA or decreasing NA has no e¤ect on the rate of adoption. If the strategy f
0010 or
f1010 is optimal, the derivatives @bq0010NA (y)@NA and bq1010NA (y)@NA are the same _ y = 1; 2, positive, and given by:
@bq0010NA (1)
@NA
=
1 [1   + 2NA]

q   qNCNA(1)

[1  ] [1   + 1NA + 2NA]2
< 0;
@bq0010NA (2)
@NA
=
2NA
1   + 2NA
@bq0010NA (1)
@NA
< 0:
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If the strategy f0011 ; f1011 or f1111 is optimal, @bq0011NA (y)@NA ; @bq1011NA (y)@NA and@bq1111NA (y)@NA are the same _
y = 1; 2 and equal to zero if the rms are initially allocated to G2. In contrast, the derivatives
@bq0011NA (1)
@NA
;
@bq1011NA (1)
@NA
and@bq1111NA (1)@NA are negative and given by:
@bq0011NA (1)
@NA
=
1

qNCNA(2)  qNCNA(1)

[1   + 1NA]2
< 0:
The derivatives @bq0010NA (y)@NA and@bq1010NA (y)@NA are the same _ y = 1; 2, positive, and given by:
@bq0010NA (1)
@NA
=   2NA
1   + 2NA
@bq0010NA (1)
@NA
> 0;
@bq0010NA (2)
@NA
=
2 [1   + 1NA]
1 [1   + 2NA]
@bq0010NA (1)
@NA
> 0:
By analogy, @bq0011NA (y)@NA ; @bq1011NA (y)@NA ; and@bq1111NA (y)@NA are the same _ y = 1; 2 and equal to zero.
Marginal Variations in Transition Probabilities
From the analysis above it follows:
 f0000. We have that @bqA(y)@A = @bqA(y)@A = @bqNA(y)@NA = @bqNA(y)@NA = 0 _ y = 1; 2. Hence, targeted
state-dependent enforcement has no e¤ect adoptersand non-adoptersemissions.
 f0010. We have that @bqA(y)@A = @bqA(y)@A = 0 _ y = 1; 2. In contrast, @bqNA(y)@NA < 0 < @bqNA(y)@NA _
y = 1; 2. Hence, targeted state-dependent enforcement has no e¤ect on adoptersemissions
but reduces non-adoptersemissions.
 f0011. We have that @bqA(y)@A = @bqA(y)@A = 0 _ y = 1; 2. In contrast, @bqNA(1)@NA < 0 = @bqNA(1)@NA ,
while @bqNA(2)@NA = @bqNA(2)@NA = 0. Hence, targeted state-dependent enforcement has no e¤ect on
adoptersor non-adoptersemissions if rms are initially allocated to G2. However, it reduces
non-adoptersemissions if they are initially allocated to G1.
 f1010. We have that @bqA(y)@A < 0 < @bqA(y)@A and @bqNA(y)@NA < 0 < @bqNA(y)@NA _ y = 1; 2. Moreover,@bqNA(y)@NA  > @bqA(x)@A  and @bqNA(y)@NA  > @bqA(y)@A _ y; x = 1; 2 and y  x, implying that the
marginal e¤ects of the probabilities NA and NA are larger than the marginal e¤ects of the
probabilities A and A.
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 f1011. We have that @bqA(y)@A < 0 < @bqA(y)@A _ y = 1; 2. In contrast, @bqNA(1)@A < @bqNA(2)@A = 0 and
@bqNA(y)
@NA
= 0 _ y = 1; 2. Moreover,
@bqA(y)@A   @bqNA(y)@NA  and @bqA(y)@A  > @bqNA(y)@NA _ y; x = 1; 2
and y  x, implying that the the marginal e¤ects of the probabilities A and A are larger
than the marginal e¤ects of the probabilities NA and NA.
 f1111. We have that @bqA(1)@A < @bqA(2)@A = 0 and @bqA(y)@A = 0 _ y = 1; 2. By analogy, @bqNA(1)@A <
@bqNA(2)
@A
= 0 and @bqNA(y)@NA = 0 _ y = 1; 2. Moreover,
@bqNA(1)@NA  > @bqA(1)@A , implying that the
marginal e¤ect of the probability NA is larger than the marginal e¤ects of the probability
A when rms are initially allocated to G1.
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Appendix D
Let us compute the derivatives of adoptersand non-adoptersexpected enforcement cost with
respect to the probabilities of transition (A; A) and (NA; NA). As shown in Table 4, regard-
less of the initial allocation, the transition probabilities (A; A) only a¤ect the cost of enforcing
compliance among adopters. We have that @ bm0000A (y)@A = @ bm0010A (y)@A = @ bm0011A (y)@A _ y = 1; 2. Moreover,
the derivatives @ bm0000A (y)@A ,@ bm0010A (y)@A , and @ bm0011A (y)@A are the same _ y = 1; 2. If adopters are initially
allocated to G1, they are equal to zero. If adopters are initially allocated to G2, they are negative
and given by:
@ bm0000A (2)
@A
=   m2 [2   1]
[1   + 2A]2
< 0:
If strategy f1010 or f1011 is optimal, the derivatives @ bm1010A (y)@A and@ bm1011A (y)@A are the same _ y =
1; 2, positive, and given by
@ bm1010A (1)
@A
=
m1 [1   + 2A] [2   1]
[1  ] [1   + 1A + 2A]2
> 0;
@ bm1010A (2)
@A
=
2A
1   + 2A
@ bm0010A (1)
@A
> 0:
The derivatives @ bm1010A (y)@A and@ bm1011A (y)@A are the same _ y = 1; 2, negative, and given by
@ bm1010A (1)
@A
=   2A
1   + 2A
@ bm0010A (1)
@A
< 0;
@ bm1010A (2)
@A
=   1A
1   + 1A
@ bm0010A (2)
@A
< 0:
If the strategy f1111 is optimal, @ bm1111A (2)@A = 0. In contrast,
@ bm1111A (1)
@A
=
m1 [2   1]
[1   + 1A]2
> 0:
Moreover, @ bm1111A (2)@A = 0, _ y = 1; 2.
Regarding the transition probabilities (NA; NA), we have that
@ bm0000NA (y)
@NA
= 0_ y = 1; 2. More-
over, the derivatives @ bm0000NA (y)@NA are the same _ y = 1; 2. If non-adopters are initially allocated to G1,
they are equal to zero. If non-adopters are initially allocated to G2, they are negative and given
by:
@ bm0000NA (2)
@NA
=   m2 [2   1]
[1   + 2NA]2
< 0:
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If the strategy f0010 or f1010 is optimal, the derivatives @ bm0010NA (y)@NA and bm1010NA (y)@NA are the same _
y = 1; 2, positive, and given by:
@ bm0010NA (1)
@NA
=
m1 [1   + 2NA] [2   1]
[1  ] [1   + 1NA + 2NA]2
> 0;
@ bm0010NA (2)
@NA
=
2NA
1   + 2NA
@ bm0010NA (1)
@NA
> 0:
The derivatives @ bm0010NA (y)@NA and@ bm1010NA (y)@NA are the same _ y = 1; 2, negative and given by:
@ bm0010NA (1)
@NA
=   2NA
1   + 2NA
@ bm0010NA (1)
@NA
< 0;
@ bm0010NA (2)
@NA
=   1NA
1   + 1NA
@ bm0010NA (2)
@NA
< 0:
If the strategy f0011 ; f1011 or f1111 is optimal, @ bm0011NA (y)@NA ; @ bm1011NA (y)@NA and@ bm1111NA (y)@NA are the same
_ y = 1; 2 and equal to zero if the rms are initially allocated to G2. In contrast, the derivatives
@ bm0011NA (1)
@NA
;
@ bm1011NA (1)
@NA
and@ bm1111NA (1)@NA are positive, and given by:
@ bm0011NA (1)
@NA
=
m1 [2   1]
[1   + 1NA]2
> 0:
By analogy, @ bm0011NA (y)@NA ; @ bm1011NA (y)@NA and@ bm1111NA (y)@NA are the same _ y = 1; 2 and equal to zero.
Marginal Variations in Transition Probabilities
From the analysis above it follows:
 f0000. We have that @ bmA(y)@A = @ bmNA(y)@NA = 0 _ y = 1; 2. Moreover, @ bmA(1)@A = @ bmNA(1)@NA = 0,
while @ bmA(2)@A < @ bmNA(2)@NA < 0. Hence, targeted state-dependent enforcement has no e¤ect
in the cost of enforcing compliance among adopters and non-adopters if they are initially
allocated to G1. However, it reduces the enforcement cost for adopters and increases the
enforcement cost for non-adopters if rms are initially allocated to G2. Since the marginal
e¤ect of A is larger than the marginal e¤ect of NA, the reduction in the enforcement cost
for adopters is larger than the increase in the enforcement cost for non-adopters.
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 f0010. We have that @ bmA(y)@A = 0 _ y = 1; 2. Moreover, @ bmA(1)@A = 0, while @ bmA(2)@A < 0. For
non-adopters, @ bmNA(y)@NA > 0 while @ bmNA(y)@NA < 0 _ y = 1; 2. Hence, targeted state-dependent
enforcement has no e¤ect in the cost of enforcing compliance among adopters if they are
initially allocated to G1, while it reduces the enforcement cost if they are initially allocated
to G2. For non-adopters, it increases the enforcement cost for all initial allocations.
 f0011. We have that @ bmA(y)@A = 0 _ y = 1; 2. Moreover, @ bmA(1)@A = 0, while @ bmA(2)@A < 0. For
non-adopters, @ bmNA(y)@NA = 0 _ y = 1; 2, @ bmNA(2)@NA = 0, while @ bmNA(1)@NA > 0. Hence, targeted
state-dependent enforcement has no e¤ect in the cost of enforcing compliance among adopters
if they are initially allocated to G1, while it reduces the enfocement cost if they are initially
allocated to G2. For non-adopters, it increases the cost of enforcement if they are initially
allocated to G1.
 f1010. We have that @ bmA(y)@A < 0 < @ bmA(y)@A and @ bmNA(y)@NA < 0 < @ bmNA(y)@NA _ y = 1; 2. Moreover,@ bmA(y)@A  > @ bmNA(x)@NA  and @ bmA(y)@A  > @ bmNA(y)@NA  _ y; x = 1; 2 and y  x, implying that the
marginal e¤ects of the probabilities A and A are larger than the marginal e¤ects of the
probabilities NA and NA. Hence, the reduction in the enforcement cost for adopters is
larger than the increase in the enforcement cost for non-adopters.
 f1011. We have that @ bmA(y)@A < 0 < @ bmA(y)@A _ y = 1; 2. In contrast, @ bmNA(1)@A > @ bmNA(2)@A = 0,
and @ bmNA(y)@NA = 0 _ y = 1; 2. Moreover,
@ bmA(y)@A   @ bmNA(y)@NA  and @ bmA(y)@A  > @ bmNA(y)@NA  _
y; x = 1; 2 and y  x, implying that the marginal e¤ects of the probabilities A and A
are larger than the marginal e¤ects of the probabilities NA and NA. Hence, the reduction
in the enforcement cost for adopters is larger than the increase in the enforcement cost for
non-adopters.
 f1111. We have that @ bmA(y)@A = @ bmNA(y)@NA = 0 _ y = 1; 2, @ bmA(2)@A = @ bmNA(2)@NA = 0, while
@ bmA(1)
@A
> @ bmNA(1)@NA > 0. Hence, targeted state-dependent enforcement has no e¤ect in the cost
of enforcing compliance among adopters and non-adopters if they are initially allocated to
G2. Instead, it reduces the enforcement cost for adopters and increases it for non-adopters
if rms are initially allocated to G1. Note that the marginal e¤ect of A is larger than the
marginal e¤ect of NA. Hence, the reduction in the enforcement cost for adopters is larger
than the increase in the enforcement cost for non-adopters.
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